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Must Criticism be constructive?
Raymond Geuss
Professor
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
 There is a widely held view — at any rate it is widely held in many 
contemporary Anglo-American societies — that ‘merely negative’ criti-
cism is somehow defective, objectionable, or inappropriate. It is part of 
the responsibility of a critic, it is assumed, not simply to denigrate some 
institution, social arrangement, or form of action, but to do so while pro-
viding at least the suggestion of a ‘preferable’ way of acting, or a ‘better’ 
way of organising some sector of the society. While this view is widely 
shared, it is perhaps not unimportant to recall that it is not universally held. 
One might think, for instance, of Bakunin who notoriously claimed ‘Die 
Lust an der Zerstörung ist auch eine schaffende Lust’ [‘The pleasure in 
destruction is itself a creative pleasure]1, or of Adorno who insisted that, 
because of the almost limitless ability of modern societies to co-opt even 
severe kinds of criticism, philosophy must be a relentlessly negative form 
of argumentative activity2. Common reactions to these examples illus-
trate perhaps the discomfort which the idea of non-constructive criticism 
arouses. One might, of course, argue that the very idea of completely nega-
tive criticism, like its mirror image, absolutely well-founded knowledge, 
is conceptually incoherent, but the most usual source of unease is not, 
I think, so much that there is anything conceptually inappropriate with 
the idea of completely negative criticism. Rather there is a fear that it is 
an anarchic abdication of responsibility on the part of the critic, so the 
suspicion is a moral rather than specifically epistemological or cognitive 
one.
 In what follows I would like to discuss three interconnected questions:
 1. What is ‘criticism’? How do we use the term? What are 
its main characteristics?
 2. In everyday life we use the term ‘criticism’ in a variety 
of ways: there is social criticism, aesthetic criticism, the moral 
criticism of individuals and their actions, cultural criticism — 
nowadays many newspapers have food and restaurant critics. Is 
there a single unitary sense of ‘criticism’ that can be found in the 
forms of ‘criticism’ actually practised in these different domains 
of human life?
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 3. Must criticism be constructive? What is supposed to be 
wrong with it, if it is not constructive?
 As far as these first two questions are concerned, I would like to sug-
gest that there is no single invariable notion of ‘criticism’ which could 
be the object of strict formal definition, giving necessary and sufficient 
conditions, but also that this does not really matter, because such formal 
definitions are not possible in most of the more important realms of hu-
man life, and neither human life itself nor philosophy is any the worse for 
this. Nevertheless, although there is no single concept of ‘criticism’ that 
designates the same activity in the domains of ethics, politics, and art, 
there are certain paradigmatic cases, and these represent ideally or fully 
developed instances of ‘criticism’. Something can perfectly legitimately 
be called ‘criticism’ that does not satisfy all the conditions which the 
idea type does. I claim that we should think of ‘criticism’ in its fullest 
possible form as comprised of four analytically (although not always re-
ally) distinct elements, aspects, or non-temporal stages. Another way of 
thinking about this is to think of our usual usage of ‘criticism’ as located 
at the point of intersection of four dimensions. I will call the first of these 
four the ‘structural’ or ‘analytic’ dimension, the second the ‘evaluative’ 
dimension, and the third the dimension of ‘argumentative connectivity’ 
and the fourth the ‘performative’ dimension. 
 The first dimension is that in which ‘criticise’ is related to ‘analyse’, 
‘distinguish’, ‘differentiate’. ‘Criticise’ (and related terms) derive from 
the Greek word κρίνω and originally meant simply ‘separate, distinguish’, 
that is, the process of taking a complex apart in thought and specifying 
its constituent parts or elements. The term ‘criticism’ was then also used 
to refer to the results of that process. Such analysis will never be strictly 
value-free, because I will be making the distinctions I do in the context 
of a specific value-driven process of some kind, and might make different 
distinctions in the context of another process of enquiry, but it will also 
not be the case that by virtue of engaging in ‘criticism’ of this kind, I am 
in any way presupposing or expressing a negative attitude toward or a 
negative judgment about the object of criticism. ‘Critique’ in this sense is 
self-evidently an activity of virtually universal application in all fields of 
human endeavour. So I can perfectly reasonably be said to be engaged in 
‘literary criticism’, if I analyse the parts of a poem, or, for instance, specify 
its metre, regardless of whatever particularly evaluative attitude I might 
have toward it. If the poem is in the Alkaic strophe, and I state that this is 
the case and helpfully write out the scansion, that is a rudimentary form 
of literary criticism, whether I especially like poetry written in the Alkaic 
strophe in general or not, or am indifferent on this issue, and whether I 
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like this particular use of the Alkaic strophe or not (or am indifferent to 
it). There might be a point in analysing the poem without explicitly judg-
ing it because in doing this I may be helping readers (or listeners) to pay 
attention to features of the work which they might otherwise overlook or 
fail to notice. This may allow readers (or listeners) to acquire an enhanced 
engagement with the poem, whether this meant that as a result a given 
reader or listener came to evaluate the poem more or less positively than 
before, or whether the evaluation remains unchanged. In addition, even if 
the analysis does not change my evaluation, it may help me to understand 
why I like or dislike the poem. Since for many people understanding why 
I have the reaction to a poem which I in fact have is part of the process of 
proper engagement with it, analysis may form part of the normal process 
of aesthetic appropriation.3
 The second of the four dimensions is one in which ‘criticise’ means 
to have or adopt an attitude or to judge, usually the attitude in question 
is a determinedly negative one toward something. So along this dimen-
sion ‘criticise’ is related to terms like ‘dislike’, ‘disapprove of’, etc. It is 
in fact an exceedingly peculiar, but undeniable, fact that a term which 
originally (in the ancient world) referred merely to the process of sepa-
rating that which was distinct, eventually developed in the direction of 
acquiring a distinctly negative connotation4. To be sure, in this case there 
does seem to be a difference in at least our linguistic usage between the 
cases of criticism of forms of human action and criticism of art. It would 
be perfectly normal to speak of a ‘critical’ attitude toward a work of art, 
meaning by that a discriminating attitude even if that resulted in a finally 
positive evaluation of the work. On the other hand, we would, I think, 
never describe a laudatory or approving attitude toward a human action, 
a piece of legislation, or a social practice or institution as an instance of 
‘critique’.
 What exactly does ‘negative attitude’ mean in the above? One obvi-
ous thing it can mean is that I explicitly formulate a proposition to the 
effect that the (criticised) object (or action or institution) in question has 
some defect or that I dislike it, think it is unfit for purpose, reject it, will 
not tolerate it, etc. I may formulate this proposition without ever uttering 
it, merely affirming it mentally, or I may state it repeatedly and out loud 
to all and sundry. Of course, though, I may develop a ‘negative attitude’ 
toward something without ever formulating anything specifically in a 
proposition. Finally, I might act in a certain way which could be con-
strued as a form of criticism. So, if I ostentatiously spit when I see you 
approach, or draw a moustache on your picture, or whistle a parody of 
your latest musical composition, or do a comic imitation of some of your 
mannerisms, these might be construed as very much like criticisms. To 
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use the classic example drawn from one of the Icelandic sagas, suppose 
you as a host give me dinner and, as I take my leave, you ask ‘How was 
my dinner?’ If I thereupon vomit up the entire contents of my stomach 
on you, it does not seem utterly fanciful to see this as a kind of criticism-
embodied-in- action (not words), even if I explicitly and truthfully deny 
that I found the food revolting.
 This idea that I might criticise merely by acting without saying 
anything, brings me to the third of my three dimensions. In cases of 
‘full-blown’ criticism the first and second of these aspects are explicitly 
connected. I would not usually think I had in front of me a case of ‘criti-
cism’ — or at any rate of ‘criticism’ in the full-blown sense—if I simply 
tell you how the object is structured or if I merely have (or even express) 
disapproval, or even if I both have an analysis and also have an evalua-
tive attitude, but don’t make any attempt to connect the two. To engage 
in criticism means not merely that I have an analysis and a judgment, but 
that I cite structural or other aspects of the thing in question as reasons 
for my approval or disapproval, or I argue from the account I give of the 
object in question to my judgment about it. So criticism has to have a 
kind of argumentative connectivity. Obviously, in most cases the notion 
of ‘argue’ here will encompass a significantly larger range of ways of 
acting than those usually countenanced by formal logic or by standard 
views about scientific inference. Usually in the argument I will appeal 
to what we now call ‘normative’ notions such as good or bad, better or 
worse, worthy, suitable, fitting. Obviously there will be questions about 
the status of any of these normative notions. Do ‘good, better, bad, worse’ 
mean ‘better’ or ‘worse’ in my estimation, or can they claim some more 
general authority?
 The fourth, performative, dimension is one in which ‘criticise’ is con-
nected with terms such as ‘vote against’ or ‘vote down’ a proposal or, ‘to 
denounce’ an action or a person, or ‘indict’ or ‘prosecute’ a person. All of 
these things (‘indict’, ‘vote down’ etc.) are in the first instance public ac-
tions. In many case they are not merely ‘public’, but also institutionalised, 
that is, they are governed by specifiable, repeatable practices of a certain 
kind. To ‘indict’ someone (for a crime) is not necessarily to disapprove of, 
or reject. or distance oneself from, what that person did on grounds that 
have to do with the way in which you think that action can be analysed. 
Rather to ‘indict’ someone is to satisfy particular specific legal require-
ments which will be given by the legal system in force. This might mean 
shouting out ‘Thief’ in a bazaar, or pronouncing an accusation in front of 
a certain number of witnesses or a magistrate, or filing a written brief in 
a certain specified form, or whatever. Often in these formal contexts there 
must be a specified object of criticism (e.g. a person who is indicted as 
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criminal) and an institutional set of consequences. If you are successfully 
indicted, you pay a fine, go to jail, or come under the guillotine. The action 
in question formally specifies the person or thing criticised and will often 
connect it specifically with particular envisaged changes of status, actions 
etc. If I am a member of a committee to award the prize for the best novel 
of the year, my vote must be for a particular work, and if enough others 
vote my way, the work I endorse will receive the prize.
 There is, to be sure, usually a kind of institutional intention which goes 
with many of these actions. If I ‘vote down’ a proposal, the institutional 
action I perform is, as it would be natural for us to say, ‘expressive of’ my 
own, underlying, (individual, ‘mental’) critically articulated disapproval 
of the proposal, or if I vote to give the prize to a certain work, that will 
usually be because I admire that work. Usually, but not always. When 
such institutional structures are formally established, this can allow the 
‘official’ intention embodied in the speech act to deviate significantly from 
the real psychic state of the person actually performing the action. Not 
every Public Prosecutor who initiates proceedings against someone who 
violates a law must actually disapprove of what the criminal has done. 
He (or she) might, as they say, ‘just be doing my job’. 
 We started with three questions, and have said something about the 
first two. The third question concerned the notion of ‘constructive’ criti-
cism. The intuition behind the idea of ‘constructive’ criticism is that the 
object criticised should really be able to be improved by reference to a form 
of action guided by the criticism itself, and it also seems to be assumed 
that there can be some consensus on what counts as ‘improvement’. So I 
may criticise the medical authorities for permitting an unqualified surgeon 
to operate on the grounds that he was permitted to kill my aunt in what 
was billed as a routine operation. The model here is that there are three 
items: a critic — in this case, me — an object (person, action, institution) 
criticised5 —in this case, the complex fact that an incompetent surgeon 
killed my aunt —and a ‘target-agent’ to whom the criticism is addressed 
or directed — in Britain this would be the General Medical Council. It 
is constructive criticism to the extent to which the ‘object’ could have 
been ‘improved’—my aunt would not have died — if the target-agent, 
the Medical Council, had been guided by what I am now saying in my 
critical remarks, i.e. had not allowed an incompetent surgeon to operate. 
Here we assume that there would be some consensus that in the relevant 
context, the situation would have been ‘better’ had my auntie survived 
the operation rather than dying. The target-agent to whom the criticism is 
directed will be some individual (or some group of people) who stands in 
a special relation to the object criticised, so that in criticising the object 
the critic is also in some sense calling the attention of the target-agent to 
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deficiencies in the object, which are thereby presented as being the target-
agent’s job to remedy. The most obvious reason for connecting criticism 
with a particular target-agent (or agents) is that this person (or these people) 
can be held in some way responsible for the existing state of the object 
by virtue of which it is deemed worthy of being criticised, and could by 
adopting the criticism in question, act or have acted so as to improve the 
object and remove the grounds for the criticism. I merely note that the 
second and third of the three items, that is, the object of criticism and the 
target, may in some cases be the same. Instead of criticising the medical 
authorities for letting the surgeon operate, I could criticise him (directly) 
for operating when unqualified. Finally, if I were such a surgeon myself 
I could engage in self-criticism in which all three items were the same.
 ‘Constructive’ criticism then goes beyond simple forms of ‘full-blown 
criticism’ that have just been described in that such full-blown ‘criti-
cism’ requires that one be able to specify what is wrong with the object, 
whereas ‘constructive’ criticism requires in addition that either a weaker 
or a stronger further condition be satisfied. The weaker condition is that 
one could also specify concretely what else would have to be changed 
in the world in order for the object to escape the criticism. The stronger 
condition is that one be able to specify what concrete steps the target-agent 
would have to undertake actually to remedy what is wrong.
 To start with the weaker condition, suppose that I criticise the surgeon 
for killing my auntie, it seems plausible, then, to distinguish two things:
a) If this object lacked features ABC, it would escape criticism
[Thus: If my auntie lacked the property of now being dead, I 
would have no complaint about the surgeon (or if I did have a 
complaint it would be a slightly different one, for instance, that 
he put her life at risk by operating despite being incompetent).]
and :
b) This — {XYZ} —is my positive alternative to the criticised 
object.
[That is, I can tell you concretely, and that presumably means in 
medical terms, what would have to be true for my auntie to have 
escaped death and still be alive.]
Statement ‘a)’ satisfies the condition of ‘argumentative connectivity’ which 
I formulated above: I disapprove of the object in question because I have 
reasons which I can specify and they are ABC. So ‘a)’ is something any 
instance of full-blown criticism will satisfy; ‘b)’ is the ‘weaker’ version of 
the additional requirement which has to be satisfied to speak of ‘construc-
tive’ criticism. It is my assumption that I can have a) without b), that is, 
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that I can have the ability to specify in relatively general terms (‘criteria’ 
if one will) what is wrong with an object without necessarily being able 
to specify what particular configuration (of this object or one sufficiently 
like it) could exist which would escape condemnation by reference to 
those general criteria. I can say my auntie ought not to be dead and this is 
grounds to criticise the surgeon even though I cannot specify what would 
be required physiologically for her still to be alive. A fortiori, I need not be 
able myself actually to produce an object or bring about a state of affairs 
which would escape the relevant criticism, or even know how to describe 
the process of bringing the better state of affairs into existence. That brings 
us to the stronger thesis: It is not a necessary condition of criticising the 
surgeon that I be able to tell him how he should have operated (rather than 
the way in which he did operate), or that I could myself have performed 
the procedure successfully.
 The stronger version of ‘constructive criticism,’ that is, adds to the 
above the further requirement:
c) that I can tell an appropriately constituted agent, the ‘target-
agent’, how exactly he or she or they should go about produc-
ing an object or bringing about a state of affairs that is better 
(improved, not subject to criticism etc.)
Think of the example: The world is overpopulated and resources are scare. 
In addition, current policies of consumption are squandering existing 
resources, and also polluting the environment to an unacceptable extent. 
I now ‘criticise’ the Directors of British Petroleum for some policy which 
their corporation has adopted. This is a form of ‘criticism’ in the last and 
fullest sense I distinguished. The Directors of British Petroleum are the 
target-agents because they are responsible for the current policy, and also 
(in some sense, although that would require considerable further analysis) 
‘could’ change it. I can point out to them features their policies would have 
to lack in order to escape the criticism I level at them. They would have 
to be less wasteful, more focused on satisfaction of real human needs, 
more likely to generate in consumers attitudes of prudence and modera-
tion, etc. Now it might well be the case that such policies are not actually 
‘realistically’ possible, given the fact that the energy sector is part of an 
economy where a certain motive and incentive structure is operative — this 
is why I flagged ‘could’ in ‘could change <the policy>’ above. ‘Could’ 
under what conditions? One might easily imagine that the Directors of BP 
(perfectly reasonably from their point of view) rejected my criticism as not 
‘constructive’. The basic point of my criticism might well be something 
they could not change, given the constraints of the market economy under 
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which they operate. If they changed their specific policies, the Directors 
could argue, they would go bankrupt and their place simply be taken by 
Shell and other companies who would have to pursue the same criticised 
policies, and what would be the point of that? Also my criticism might be 
such that to answer it would require that they and their whole organisation 
simply not exist at all in anything like its present form. The only solution, 
that is, might be that entities like BP be abolished and, thus, that people 
like those on the Board of Directors simply have a completely different 
social role, that they not be Directors of international corporations but 
have ‘honest’ jobs (and hence also completely different desires, beliefs, 
attitudes, powers, etc.). It is not difficult to see how the current Directors 
of BP might well fail to see this as ‘constructive criticism’ in the usual 
sense of that term, because a situation in which they do not exist might 
fail to register with them as an improvement and hence something they 
could reasonably be expected to want. But then that might well be their 
problem. Equally they might argue that it was even beyond their power 
to abolish themselves; they could, resign, but that would simply mean, as 
above, that others would take their places. A change of personnel without 
a change of roles, structures or policy imperatives would be no improve-
ment. What might count as ‘constructive’ for us, i.e. what we could do 
something about, given our identities and possibilities, need not be the 
same as what is constructive for them (given their identity and situation). 
What counts as ‘constructive’ is thus relative to some notion of what is 
not merely ‘logically’ but ‘realistically possible,’ and that in turn depends 
on what can ‘realistically’ be expected of different possible target-agents. 
Appeal, for instance by the Directors of BP, to the requirement that criti-
cism be ‘constructive’ can thus often have the function of trying to shift the 
onus probandi in a particular way. I, as critic, am required to formulate my 
criticism in a way that is shaped to the perspective and the action-related 
demands of the target-agents. I must criticise them (and their actions, the 
institutions in which they participate etc.) in a way that conforms to what 
‘they’ define as what they can ‘reasonably’ be expected to do and results 
they can ‘reasonably’ be expected to accept.
 This shows the extreme importance in criticism of notions like pos-
sibility and necessity, of alternative identities and courses of action, and 
of assumptions about which points in what framework are taken to be 
fixed and which are taken to be variable. This in turn raises important 
general issues about the malleability of human nature and institutions, 
and the possible limits of such malleability, utopianism, tragic or oth-
erwise irresolvable forms of conflict, and the ‘substitutivity’ of goods, 
services, practices and institutions. Certainly the idea of ‘constructive 
criticism’ seems to be closely connected with the notion of substitutivity. 
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By ‘substitutivity’ I mean in the simplest case that one object or process 
can stand in for or take the place of another. I can take the sugar cube out 
of the bowl with a special set of tongs, but if there are no tongs, I could 
also use a spoon (i.e. ‘substitute’ a spoon for the tongs). Even if there is 
no spoon, I could in principle fall back on the use of my fingers, which is 
slightly less hygienic, but no less effective. A standard kind of ‘constructive 
criticism’ would be a case in which I tell a child not to take the sugar cube 
with its fingers, because that is unhygienic, but rather to use the tongs. 
Here I am saying that the tongs is a viable substitute for the use of fingers 
in this context, and one that has certain advantages. Similarly in many, 
although perhaps not strictly all, cases I can substitute a fork for a set of 
chop sticks, or vice versa. Action-related forms of criticism would seem 
to depend very heavily on claims to the effect that the criticised object, 
process, institution (etc.) could be replaced by some other, i.e. that there 
is a possible substitute for it.
 The idea of substituting one thing or process for another is deeply 
rooted in human social institutions and thinking, and it is not obvious how 
we could get along without it.6 Nevertheless, there is a certain ‘natural’ 
tendency we have to fall for an illusion about substitutivity. This illusion 
is the view that items (things, processes, institutions, practices, etc.) can 
be treated for the purposes of substitution atomistically. This means that 
one can ignore the wider context within which the item in question stands, 
and discuss possible substitutes for it relative to one narrowly specified 
use or function. It is not, however, the case that this narrow focus always 
makes sense. It is true that one can ‘in principle’ use either the Western 
combination of knife, fork, and spoon or chopsticks for eating most of 
the normal kinds of food with which we in the early 21st century will be 
confronted, but two qualifications need to be added. First, this assumes 
that the ‘food’ in question will admit of being eaten in either way. This is 
true of rice, potatoes, most vegetables, but not for instance soup or honey 
which can be eaten with a spoon but not with chopsticks7. So one must 
take account of the way in which the item in question ‘fits into’ a wider 
human context, if it is a utensil to eat, then it must fit into kind of food 
that will be eaten and the way in which that food is prepared. The second 
qualification concerns one specific aspect of the ‘total context’ within 
which (potential) substitution might take place. Chopsticks might be us-
able ‘in principle’ to eat rice, and they might even be actually usable my 
thousands of millions of people in the Orient and hundreds of thousands in 
the West, but they are not usable, and hence could not substitute for knife/
fork/spoon, unless the agents who are to use them have certain specific 
form of manual dexterity to operate chopsticks (or knife/fork/spoon). 
Motor vehicles can replace horses and wagons only if people develop the 
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new skills that are required to drive the new vehicles, and these skills need 
to be cultivate, sometimes at some cost and do not come from nowhere. 
Part of the ‘context’ that must be taken into account is the relevant forms 
of habitual human action. 
 It is easy to see how this argument can then be expanded, because 
there is not ‘in principle’ any determinate, natural stopping place at which 
features of the context became irrelevant. Or perhaps as Heidegger claims 
there is only one non-arbitrary stopping point and that is my own death 
(or rather my relation-in-living to my own death). This is something that 
is not further contextualisable (for me), where substitutivity reaches its 
limits8. 
 So, it makes no sense to think about substitutivity of items apart 
from their context and that context is open-ended. This may be one of the 
reasons why the scope of criticism seems naturally to expand, and why 
repressive regimes often react hysterically to what seem to be very minor 
forms of criticism; once it starts there is no telling where it will go (and 
where it will end). One especially important aspect of this ‘context’ is the 
possible other forms of value the old object had. Independently of their 
efficiency as tools for eating, spoons and forks might even have valued 
aesthetic properties which the simpler chopsticks lack; elaborate, durable, 
distinctively shaped, metal forks might even have acquired sentimental (i.e. 
not aesthetic) value as mementoes of the past, something ephemeral and 
historically anonymous chopsticks lack. Since people for various reasons 
often value a sense of continuity, some things might be considered to have 
intrinsic value merely because they are old and familiar9. There will then 
be costs associated with any substitution, both the cost of the new item 
that is to be provided and of the transition to the new mode of provision. 
 ‘Constructive criticism’ doesn’t just mean that I can name or describe 
something that is in some sense substitutable for something else, difficult 
as it is to isolate a fixed context for this claim, but the new constructive 
suggestion has to be of something both substitutable and better. The less 
fixed the context, the more difficult it will be always to get agreed-on 
judgments that a substitute is (overall?) better.
 Even completely radical forms of political criticism will need at least 
to some extent to be committed to some kind of substitutivity, unless it 
becomes theological. It will not, of course, be the case that one can atom-
istically compare the new structure of the stock-market after a revolution 
with the structure before, because there may be no stock-market after the 
revolution. There may be no banking system we could recognise, but there 
will still be forms of future-oriented cooperation. At some sufficiently 
general level there will have to be a new way of providing foodstuffs to 
the population which will replace the old way. It might also be the case 
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that it is possible only retrospectively to see that the new form of agricul-
tural production really does ‘substitute’ for an older form, but that is a 
different issue. The more one thinks about radical substitution, the more 
one must confront the question of the interconnection of human tastes/
desires/needs, on the one hand, and ways through which these tastes are 
satisfied on the other. I mean by ‘interconnection’ a relation of influence 
that is specifically construed as operating in both directions. Given that 
we have certain tastes, we wish to satisfy them in certain ways with 
certain objects, processes, forms of human interaction, but those forms 
of interaction, processes, objects etc, in their turn strongly influence the 
tastes/desires/aspirations/needs which we acquire.
 In the political realm appeals to the need for ‘constructive’ criticism 
can in principle represent a (generally laudable) attempt to remind human 
agents of the imperative nature of Tschernyschevsky’s (and later Lenin’s) 
central question ‘What is to be done?’10; in fact, however, the demand for 
‘constructive criticism’ can also function as a repressive attempt to shift the 
onus probandi — I can’t criticise the surgeon because I couldn’t explain 
in detail how he ought to have operated (beyond saying that he ought not 
to have killed my auntie). The demand for constructive criticism can also 
divert attention from the very possibility of radical criticism, because who 
would have the knowledge of the world as a whole and skill and practical 
wisdom needed for that?
 To return, in concluding, to the question we set out from about the 
vague unease that is generated by non-constructive forms of criticism, 
it is probably as much an illusion to think that a philosopher can be 
sheerly negative in relation to our given beliefs, practices, institutions, 
and habits, as it is to think that he or she can attain an absolutely ground-
ed, complete and finally correct picture of the world. The demands, by 
people like Adorno, for radically negative forms of critical philosophy 
are better understood, as he himself frequently suggests, not as theses, 
but as indicators of a direction, as ‘exaggerations’11 presented in order 
to draw people’s attention to certain facts we would be likely otherwise 
to overlook. One such fact is that historically variable, but very substan-
tial, assumptions about what it is reasonable (or even possible) to expect 
of people lie hidden in our everyday language, in so-called ‘common 
sense’, and in our usual ways of thinking about human action. Failing 
to question these means taking them for granted, and that is a moral and 
political act. Accepting the demand that criticism be constructive can be 
just as much an abdication of the responsibility of the critic as mindless 
destructiveness is. Which of the two attitudes is appropriate can’t be set-
tled apriori.
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Notes
 1. See R. Wagner Mein Leben (as cited in Unterhaltungen mit Bakunin ed. 
A. Lehning (Leipzig: Reclam, 1989), pp. 104-112
 2. Adorno Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt, 1966)
 3. See Adorno Ästhetische Theorie (Frankfurt, 1969)
 4. If one wished to multiply distinctions, one could actually distinguish three 
items here: a) analysis, b) judgment, c) specifically negative evaluative judgment. 
So the sake of simplicity I shall refrain from pursuing this here.
 5. Obviously, the term ‘object’ is used in a very broad sense
 6. Thus, in Sophokles’ Antigone, (ll. 905ff.) Antigone gives as the main rea-
son for her determination to bury her dead brother Polyneikes that her brother is 
irreplaceable in contrast to a possible husband or child. If she lost a husband, she 
says, she could always get another, the same is true of a child, but, given that her 
mother and father are dead, there cannot be a substitute for her brother. For that 
matter one might argue that the very earliest work in the Western canon The Iliad 
is nothing but an extended meditation on what can and what cannot be substituted 
for what else. If Agamemnon has to give his slave-girl up, who will replace her? 
Agamemnon claims later that not even his wife would be a satisfactory substitute. 
Is gold a good substitute for bronze (VI.235ff.) or armour worth nine oxen a good 
exchange for armour worth a hundred? Can Patroklos be an adequate substitute 
for Achilles on the field of battle? How about if he is wearing Achilles’ armour? 
Is dead Hektor a good substitute for live Patroklos?
 7. In thinking about all these examples, which are perhaps not ideally suited 
to illustrate my point, one should abstract from the fact that most humans naturally 
have fingers and opposable thumbs which can also (in emergencies) be used to 
transfer food to the mouth.
 8. Heidegger Sein und Zeit §§ 46-53) (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1963), pp. 235-
67.
 9. Nowadays, of course, in the age of mass advertising, the reverse of this 
will also present, namely a desperate desire to acquire what is ‘new’ even if it is 
no more efficient, as anyone can testify who has watched someone struggle in vain 
with a new gadget, such as an electronic agenda, while defensively asserting that 
it ‘really’ is better than the old way of noting appointments (writing them down 
with a pencil or pen in a diary) when this is palpably not the case.
 10. It is, of course, slightly ironic, at any rate for someone who adopts the 
perspective proposed in this essay that What is to be Done? is the title of a novel 
(N.G. Tschernyschewski Was tun? [Aufbau-Verlag 1986]).
 11. Adorno Eingriffe (Frankfurt, 1963) p. 152
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